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People v. Tichenor 5l
(decided May 8, 1997)
Defendant, Noel Tichenor, was convicted of disorderly conduct
and

resisting

arrest."

On

appeal,

he

challenged

the

constitutionality of the New York State disorderly conduct
statute53 under both the Federal 4 and New York State
Constitutions. 5 Defendant claimed that the statute was vague, in
violation of the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that it was overly broad in violation of the First
Amendment. 6 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction and held that: (1) the disorderly conduct statute was

not overbroad on its face; (2) the statute in question was not

5'89 N.Y.2d 769, 680 N.E.2d 606, 658 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1997).
5 Id. at 772, 680 N.E.2d at 607, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
5 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1997). Section 240.20 provides in
pertinent part:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to
cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof: 1) He engages in fighting
or inviolent, tumultuous behavior or threatening behavior; or
2) He makes an unreasonable noise; or 3) In a public place,
he uses abusive, or obscene language or makes an obscene
gesture.
Id.
-" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without the due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech." Id.
" Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d 769, 680 N.E.2d 606, 658 N.Y.S.2d 233. See N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6. The Freedom of Speech and Press Clause of the New
York State Constitution provides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right;
and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or the
press." Id.
56 Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d at 775-77, 680 N.E.2d at 609-10, 658 N.Y.S.2d at
236-37.
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unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the evidence supported a finding
that defendant intended to create a public disturbanceY
Defendant, Noel Tichenor, was standing outside a bar shortly
after midnight when a police officer walked by the bar and
defendant uttered an obscenity at him.58 The officer was about
eight feet away from defendant when defendant spat on the
ground in the direction of the policeman's feet.59 Once the officer
moved toward him, defendant then proceeded to shove the officer
while uttering additional obscenities. 6 ° After this encounter, the
officer attempted to arrest him, but defendant proceeded to
reenter the bar. 61 The officer tried to handcuff defendant while a
group of bar patrons congregated in the doorway of the
establishment, with some of them screaming various lewd
remarks directed at the officer.6' While the officer called for
assistance, the defendant escaped from the officer's grasp and
walked back into the bar.6' The officer followed defendant inside
the bar and attempted to arrest him again. 64 An altercation began
between the officer and defendant. Bar patrons joined in to assist
the defendant.6a When additional police arrived, they found
defendant and several other individuals on top of the police
officer.6 Ultimately, the police restored order and placed the
defendant under arrest. 67 Following a jury trial, defendant was
convicted of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest but was
acquitted of harassment charges. 68
Relying on People v. Dietze, 69 defendant appealed asserting that
the disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutional." In Dietze,"
58 Id.

58 Id.
59
Id.
60

id.

61 Id.

62 Id.
63Id.

64Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
6SId.

69 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1989).
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the New York Court of Appeals held a harassment statute
unconstitutional.72 Specifically, the statute in Dietze prohibited
abusive language with intent to badger or alarm. 3 The Dietze
court found that the statute, which encompassed constitutionally

protected free speech, was overbroad.74

The Dietze court

reasoned that although the speech could be "abusive" or could

"annoy"; nevertheless, the speech was constitutionally protected
if it did not present "a clear and present danger of some serious
substantive evil. . .. "' The Tichenor court distinguished the

Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d at 773, 680 N.E.2d at 608, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
The court rejected defendant's claims stating that "[a] party seeking to nullify
a statute as unconstitutional must overcome the presumption of constitutionality
that favors legislative enactments." Id. See also People v. Dempiero, 86
N.Y.2d 549, 658 N.E.2d 718, 634 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1995); People v. Scalza, 76
N.Y.2d 604, 563 N.E.2d 705, 562 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1990); In re Van Berkel v.
Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 209 N.E.2d 539, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1965).
7, Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 50, 549 N.E.2d at 1167, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 596. The
complainant and her son who were both mentally retarded, were walking down
a street when they were approached by the defendant and his friend. Id.
Although defendant was aware of the complainant's mental retardation, he still
called her a "bitch" and her son a "dog." Id. Defendant further added that
he would "beat the crap out of the [complainant] some day or night on the
street." Id. Complainant ran away in tears and told the authorities of the
occurrence. Id. A similar incident had previously occurred between the
defendant and the complainant. Id. The court concluded that the speech in
this case was abusive but "defendant's words [did] not, however, fall within
the scope of constitutionally proscribable expression, which is considerably
narrower than that of the statute." Id. at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550
N.Y.S.2d at 597.
72 Id. at 50, 549 N.E.2d at 1167, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
13 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1989).
Section 240.25, before it
was amended, provided in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another person: 1. He strikes, shoves, kicks
or otherwise subjects him to physical contact, or attempts or
threatens to do the same; or 2. In a public place, he uses
abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture.
Id.
74 Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
"5Id. (citing Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948)). The Dietze court
further noted that "[s]peech is often 'abusive'-even vulgar, derisive, and
provocative-and yet it is still protected under the State and Federal
7
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harassment statute in Dietze from the disorderly conduct statute at
bar and explained that the latter was "directed at words and
utterances coupled with an intent to create a risk of public
disorder, which the State has the authority and responsibility to
prohibit, prevent and punish."0 6 In other words, the harassment
statute on its face would make constitutionally protected speech
illegal in contrast to the disorderly conduct statute which
addressed speech that creates a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil.'
The court emphasized that, at common law, misconduct could
be prosecuted as a public nuisance and that a common factor in
such legislation was to attempt to deter breaches of the peace
adversely affecting the community's safety, health and morals.

The Tichenor court also emphasized that the New York State
Court of Appeals had upheld the constitutionality of predecessor
statutes which were similarly worded79 and that the United States
Supreme Court had affirmed those conclusions.Wo Specifically,
Constitutional guarantees of free expression" Id. See Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (holding a Louisiana ordinance which prohibited
the use of obscene language directed at a police officer to be overbroad in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
76 People v. Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d 769, 775, 680 N.E.2d 606, 609, 658
N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (1997). See also People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 91
N.E.2d 316 (1950).
n Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
' Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d at 773-74, 680 N.E.2d at 608, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 235
(citing People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326, 406 N.E.2d 780, 428 N.Y.S. 924

(1980)).
79 People v.
Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 91 N.E.2d 316 (1950).
1 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (holding that the state has the
authority to prohibit or penalize when clear and present danger threatens public
safety). In Feiner, both black and white gathered in the streets to listen to
defendant speak. Id at 316. Defendant made a speech to listeners in which he
made derogatory statements about government officials, and advocated that
black persons should rise up in arms and fight for equal rights. Id. at 317.
Police were present at this event and simply observed the speech without
interrupting for some time without interrupting defendant's speech. Id.
However, once they perceived a threat of violence ensuing, the defendant was
told to end his speech. Defendant refused and was subsequently arrested. Id.
at 317-18
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the New York Court of Appeals has "steadfastly upheld the
constitutionality of New York's disorderly conduct statutes." 81
Thus, the Court of Appeals asserted the doctrine of stare decisis
in support of its conclusion.82
The Tichenor court rejected defendant's argument that the
disorderly conduct statute was vague. 8" Again, the court noted
that the vagueness challenge had been previously rejected. 84 The
court determined that the statute provides sufficient notice of what
conduct is prohibited and that the statute is not written in such a
manner as to permit or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.85 "The statutory requirement that the defendant
possess an intent to 'cause, or recklessly create a risk of, public
the definition, so
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, narrows
86
that no inadvertent act may be punished."
Defendant, again relying on Dietze, argued that the disorderly
conduct statute was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his
case, asserting that his altercation with the police officer was a
private encounter.87 However, the New York Court of Appeals
stated that a reasonable jury could infer that defendant intended to
create a public disturbance and that the defendant's disruptive
Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d at 774, 680 N.E.2d at 609, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 236
(citing People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 258 N.E.2d 711, 310
N.Y.S.2d 303 (1970); People v. Thomas, 23 N.Y.2d 659, 242 N.E.2d 490,
295 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1968); People v. Turner, 17 N.Y.2d 829, 218 N.E.2d
8

316, 271 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966)).
82 Id. The court stated: "Appellant would have us ignore or overrule the
potent stare decisis effect of these ... precedents." Id.
83 Id. at 775, 680 N.E.2d at 609-10, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37.
84

Id. (citing People v. Hardy, 47 N.Y.2d 500, 392 N.E.2d 1233, 419

N.Y.S.2d 49 (1979); People v.Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325, 258 N.E.2d 711, 310

N.Y.S.2d 303 (1970); People v. Thomas, 23 N.Y.2d 659, 242 N.E.2d 490,
295 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1968); People v. Turner, 17 N.Y.2d 829, 218 N.E.2d

316, 271 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966); People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 91 N.E.2d
316 (1950)).
" Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d at 775-76, 680 N.E.2d at 610, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 237
(citing People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66

(1988)).
86 Id. (citing People v. Bakolas, 59 N.Y.2d 51, 449 N.E.2d 738, 462
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1983)).
87 Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d at 776, 680 N.E.2d at 610, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
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behavior at the doorstep of a bar was an encounter of a public
nature rather than a private altercation.88 Since the altercation
was likely to escalate into a public inconvenience, it falls within
the statute's definition of discriminatory conduct. 89 Furthermore,
the court explained that the evidence of the defendant eluding the
officer when slipping into the bar can support an inference that
defendant intended to cause public disorder. 9'
Relying on established New York law, the Tichenor court held
that the disorderly conduct statute was not unconstitutionally
vague and that defendant intended to create a public disturbance. 9'
New York State courts, when faced with similar statutes like the
one challenged in Tichenor, have held that those statutes may
limit free speech when it is of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil.9 It is clear that states may afford greater
protection to the guarantees of freedom of speech and press than
provided under the Federal Constitution. However, in the instant
case, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the
disorderly conduct statute was constitutionally valid because the
defendant's conduct may be described as the type of conduct that
a state has the right and responsibility to punish. 9

88 Id.

at 776-77, 680 N.E.2d at 610, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
d. at 777, 680 N.E.2d at 610, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
90 Id.
s9

91Id.

I See People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 51, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 1168, 550
N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (1989).
3 Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d at 777, 680 N.E.2d at 610, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
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